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WILL SKEPTICISM TREND TOWARDS EPICUREANISM?
BY JOHN IIEINTZ
BIOLOGY teaches us that man, in common with the rest of the
animate world, finds it necessary, in order to survive, to adapt
himself to his physical environment. But there is another adaptation
that man makes to his world, which he does not share with the
lower orders of creation, which constitutes an adjustment problem
peculiar to man and which springs from his superior mental en-
dowment. It has been rightly called the urge of man to relate him-
self to life and his ultimate destiny.
The study of anthropology reveals no race so low in the scale
of civilization but what this problem has presented itself and has
been dealt with in some manner, however crude. Animism, ancestor
worship, wooden idols, sacred animals and mountains, totem-poles,
the great religions and philosophies all testif\- to the elfort on the
part of humanity to adjust itself to its immediate condition and
ultimate destiny. All along the line of man's evolution from a lower
to a higher civilization there is revealed the phenomenon that he
has been impelled by his reasoning faculty to answer the questions,
in one way or another, which the universe aroused in his mind.
Now if we consider this apparent need on the part of humanity
for bringing itself into some sort of harmonious relationship with
the world in connection with the steady increase of religious skep-
ticism, it forces one to the inescapable conclusion that there must be
great numbers of persons who are at present engaged in the process
of adjusting themselves to a changed viewpoint. The dissolut'on
of the ancestral order, to use Walter Lippmann's phrase, has brought
innumerable persons face to face with a readjustment problem ; it
has created the need for an attitude consistent with newer convic-
tions. Faced, then, by the certainty of a gradually accelerating
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{^n-owth of skepticism and l>y the conse(|uent necessity for adjust-
ing themselves to a changed order of things on the part of an ever-
increasing number of persons, can we predict, with any degree of
certaint}', just what direction this adjustment movement will take?
ily what intellectual form it will express itself?
Hut first it will be well for us to understand that in the realm of
morals things do not just hajijicn. Moral history is not merel\ a
chronological series of events, it is a continuous chain of cause
and effect. That there is a sufficient reason back of every leaf that
stirs is not more certain than that e\ery circumstance in moral his-
tory has been the inescai)al)le effect of contributing causes. We read
with incredulit\ about the fastings, scourgings, macerations, self-
inflicted penalties and unheard of ])ractises which were indulged in
during the ascetic ])eriod of C'liristianity. Surel\ here is some-
thing so grote-(iue and unusual that it creates the api)earance of
spontaneity, but one may start with hard, practical, skeptical Roman
Stoicism and trace, step b\- stej). the gradual modifications of thought
which led to that frenzied religious period.
As with the i)ast. so with today. Cause and effect is ceaselessly
at work. And while, owing to tlie speculative nature of thought,
the inadequacy of knowledge, and the numerous historical accidents
which inter\ened between the two ])eriods, it would have been im-
possible for a Stoical philosopher to have foreseen the ascetic period
of Christianity, we toda\-, because science has given us a real con-
ception of our world, because knowledge is more certain and dif-
fused, and also because our machine civilization pos-esses a more
enduring (|uality than did those of the warring nations of anti(|uity,
may analyze and forecast the developments in soc'ety with a fair
degree of accuracy. I believe the key to the trend of skepticism is
to be found in its reaction to tlirec fundamental problems which
confront e\ery individual—virtue, death and the meaning of life.
Analyzing these three problems in the order named I shall endeavor
to show that the reaction of ske])ticism to them must necessarily be
an Epicurean one.
Tt appears to me that a thoroughly logical skeptic'sm cannot go
beyond utility in its search for moral sanction. Once it abandons,
in its reaction to virtue, the ideas that moral sanction is derived from
on high and that the moral nature of man is of divine origin, utility
becomes their onl\ explanation. It is quite true that skeptics may
WILL SKEPTICISM TRLXD TOWARDS KPICURKAX ISM ? 183
love certain moral ideas for their intrinsic worth. The\' ma\' also
recognise fully the supremac}- and authority of conscience and
possess a Stoical regard for virtuous actions carrying them out with-
out regard for the effect upon themselves. Their sense of justice
may be keen. Their emotional feelings may be sensitively fine and
pure. Nevertheless, if they are logical skeptics they cannot regard
such moral conceptions as being intuitive, originall}- innate, or dog-
maticall}- authorized, but must esteem them to be but a crystallized
heritage from a remote past during which foretime they originated
in response to utility but became metamorphosed, by an association
of ideas, from but a means to happiness to an end justifxing their
own existence.
Skepticism," therefore, inasmuch as its reaction to the question
of virtue compels it to analyze moral notions, and because it has dis-
pensed with dogmatic authority and cannot unquestioningly accept
inherited moral conceptions, must depend for its acceptance of them
upon their utility. In other words, virtues, under skepticism, will
be raised to the position of supreme arbiter in the field of morals,
thus transferring the authority for them from a source without to
one within. That reason may prove to be fallible in its findings and
that some disagreement may ensue is not germane to the argument
the point of which is that skepticism, driven by the log'c of its posi-
tion to dissociate moral ideas from the mass of superstitious and
traditional elements that have entwined around them, distrustful
of dogmatic authority and mindful of the fluctuations of moral his-
tory, will be compelled to depend on reason for a gu'de and utilit}"
for its criterion in defining what constitutes virtue. In such an at-
tempt to place morals on a rational basis skepticism will be us'iig a
similar method to that which was used in the early da}s of the
human race when ethics and theology were separate and distinct
things ; when the test of morals was how they worked in the every-
dav affairs of life. Thus skepticism, in its search for moral justi-
fication, simpK' cannot escape the Epicurean viewpoint which is
that virtue has no value in itself; its sole justification consisting in
its being a means for the promotion of happiness, or in other words,
in its utility.
With regard to the problem of death the inescapable reaction to
it on the part of skepticism appears to have been completely stated
in Epicureanism. Boiled down to its essentials that philosophy af-
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firmed that death cannot be felt. \\ hen we are dead we are just the
same as if we had never been born. Therefore the only time death
can injure us i> when we allow ourselves to think of it. It is inevit-
able and worrying about it canncjt make it otherwise and deprives us,
for the time being, of pleasure which is the real end of existence.
Thus, he who is truly wise will banish all thought of it out of his
mind.
Present-day skepticism can be contrasted with its predecessors
of antiquity on account of the wide scope of knowledge which has
been placed at its disposal. Science and scholarship have examined
into records and records left by the past and the result has been
to entirety disprove all the revelations and ])rophecies and promises
of the revealed religions. Up to the present time no acceptable
proof has been presented w'hich justifies a belief in a future existence
for man. Confronted by such facts what is there left for skepticism
to do but to resign itself to the possibility of annihilation and ac-
cept the thoroughly sensible and applicable adjustment to such a
situation as is taught by Epicureanism?
Will skepticism accei:)t the Epicurean viewpoint regarding the
meaning of life ?
I'robably the most depressing thought that can come to an\one
is that all the struggling and achieving of humanity, the everpress-
ing onward to greater heights, will eventualK- be canceled b\- its
annihilation. The mental image of this earth spinning through space
a barren planet, utterly devoid of life, not only dej)icts a tragedy
more despairingly ])oignant than any that blacken the i)ages of his-
tory but impresses the mind with the utter futility and purposeless-
ness of the operations of nature considered in their entiret\'. How-
ever, against this gloomy background is the fact that one ma\- ex-
tract, in a single span of human existence, a certain amount of pleas-
ure, and in a world created by a fortuitous combination of chemical
substances, in which no purpose, no reason for its creation can be
discovered, in which no divine plan is discernable, and in which the
true meaning of life must therefore be reasoned out, pleasure
irresistibly presents itself as that which best serves the ends of
existence. One world at a time must be the motto of a consistent
skepticism. This being the case the immediate end of life are the
logical goal of our efforts and there can be no question. I think, but
that they are best served by hedonism ( I am using the term broad-
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1\-, in its true Epicurean sense, which differs greatly from the more
constricted use of it in the modern sexy novel) for not only is the
pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, in the broadest and
best sense of these words, absolutely in conformance with human
nature, and therefore a legitimate aim, but they surely constitute
the most sensible reason that skepticism will be able to give, out-
side the struggle for survival, for the justification of everyday human
activities.
Xow if all this reasoning is logical and sound, in proportion as
skepticism spreads through society there will develop a moral move-
ment whose trend will incline toward, and approximate, at least, the
views which Epicurus expounded to his disciples in his garden at
Athens. This result, of course, will not be accomplished by deliber-
atel\- attempting to foster such views upon society but will be brought
about by a development inherent within skepticism itself. Science
has given us positive assurance that we live in the sort of a world
which Epicurus sensed, despite the imperfections of his knowledge,
and his philosophy, inasmuch as it was the logical reaction of a
practical mind to that kind of a universe, inevitably stated the case
for straight thinking along purely naturalistic lines for all time. It
attempted to relate man to a rational world, one free from super-
stition and supernatural intervention, which is exactly the problem
that faces skepticism today.
Admittedly this Epicurean reaction to the problems of virtue,
death and the meaning of life may not prove to be competent to
solve all of the difficulties which grow out of the modern com-
plexity of society. The mere fact that a man comes to regard virtue
as being resolved out of utility does not necessarily make him more
moral than when he regarded it as being dogmatically authorized.
Walter Lippmann points out in his latest book that the danger in
hedonism is due to the yielding to immature desires and that the sal-
vation of morals in an unbelieving world depends upon a disin-
terested type of character in business, government and sexual re-
lations which the demands of our complex machine civilization is
bringing into existence ; a sort of Stoical type which is destined to
justify the wisdom of the sages and the insight of high religion.
All of which is very likely true. In which case history appears
destined to repeat itself and the future skeptical society may con-
ceivably witness Epicureanism and Stoicism developing side by side,
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except that whf re they were ri\al> in the ancient Roman state, in the
modern one they will complement each other. L'nless skeptic'sm
dispenses with lojj^ic altogether the future society will be basically
and fundamentally Epicurean because that philosoph\- is the in-
evitable reaction t(j the j^lace of man in nature as science has re-
vealed it to us. If Stoicism plays a role at all it will be that of a
complementar\- one. Sui)plying what Epicureanism fails to supply
it will grow out of a need of modern complex machine society just
as it grew out of the need for patriotism in the militaristic Roman
state. Rather than a philosophy, with certain tenets to expound,
it will furnish the religious motive in an age of skepticism.
